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THE IMPACT OF U.S. TRADE LAW ON
GOVERNMENT POLICY MAKING IN THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
P.K Chiang*
Since President Reagan signed the Omnibus Trade Act on August
23, 1988, the U.S. government has completed a series of investigations
according to the provisions of the Act. Consultations aimed at forcing
its trading partners to adjust their trade- policies which are regarded as
unfair to U.S. trade have also been held in the past ten months or so.
Being one of the most important trading partners of the U.S. - both
in terms of its overall trade volume and its surplus with the U.S. - the
Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC) seems to have become a target of
retaliatory measures implied in the Act. During the period from Au-
gust of last year to this date, the U.S. has consulted intensively with
the ROC on various trade issues. The possible implementation of the
Trade Act seemed to have been implied throughout most of the talks.
Therefore, the results of consultations often had an impact on the
trade policy of the ROC. On the other hand, the adjustments that the
ROC has made to cope with the new environment of the world econ-
omy have also been instrumental in formulating the ROC's new trade
policy. All in all, the ROC's trade policy has been transformed, over
the past twenty-five years, from an export-oriented one to the present
one which encourages imports with a view toward balancing the two-
way trade. In order to carry out this policy, the ROC has adopted a
series of measures not only to expedite the liberalization of its market,
but also to increase its purchases from the U.S.
THE PURPOSE OF THE U.S. TRADE ACT
Before I go deeper into this topic, I wish to examine the purpose of
the U.S. Omnibus Trade Act and its legal background, from my view-
point, to tell you how we assess the Act and the influence the Act is
intended to have on the U.S.'s trade partners.
1. Elimination of Double Deficits
With the exceptions of the years 1974 and 1975, the U.S. has suf-
fered trade deficits since 1971. These deficits, along with a federal
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budget deficit, have been the two major problems confronting the U.S.
government in the eighties. They have not only reduced the employ-
ment level of the U.S., but also have affected the debt position of the
U.S. government. As a result, protectionism was revived. Measures
with protectionist sentiment, such as quota control systems, were reg-
ularly imposed. Trade acts such as the Trade Act of 1974 and the
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 have been introduced with a view toward
opening foreign markets and enhancing the competitiveness of U.S.
products. These laws have provided a complete set of legal procedures
which serve as a basis for the U.S. government to enforce its actions to
open foreign markets for U.S. products. In order to achieve effectively
the goals set forth in the acts, the power of imposing retaliation upon
trade partners was also granted to the Administration by the U.S.
Congress.
2. Intensified Retaliation Against Exchange Rate Manipulation and
Home Market Closure
The scope of retaliation and the application of the laws have been
intensified with the worsening of the U.S. trade deficit. The Omnibus
Trade Act of 1988 was thus enacted to strengthen the power of the
existing laws and to speed up the recovery of the competitiveness of
U.S. products. It is also equipped with instruments that aim to redress
the U.S. position of trade imbalance by requesting the trade partners
not to manipulate their exchange rate or accelerate the opening of
their markets. The Act also expands the scope of its application by
adding export targeting, denial of worker's rights, and foreign cartels
to the list of "unreasonable" trade practices, and sets a timetable of
three years for the removal of unjustifiable and unreasonable trade
practices.
THE ROC'S POSITION TOWARD THE TRADE ACT
1. The ROC Advocates Free Trade
The ROC has always advocated free trade because it has benefited
from the open trade philosophy so promoted in the international com-
munity. We appreciate the U.S. efforts in seeking a free and open
world trade system as proclaimed in the Omnibus Trade Act. We
fully recognize that a free and open world trade system helps to pro-
mote the growth of world trade and serves as a vehicle to enable each
country to become competitive in manufacturing products on the prin-
ciple of comparative advantage.
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2. The ROC Advocates Fair Trade
We also support the idea of establishing a fair trade system under
which all trading countries compete with each other on a fair basis.
We are convinced that only through the establishment of a fair trade
system can we promote our trade in an orderly manner. This again
helps to promote world trade.
3. The ROC's Reservation about the Act
In view of the above, I want to point out that we share President
Reagan's viewpoints, expressed in his statement when he signed the
Act. He said it is possible that the Act could lead to an import fee that
would be illegal according to international law and inconsistent with
the U.S. goal of moving toward free world trade. He also commented
that the language of the Act claiming to require the executive branch
to negotiate with foreign countries on certain specified trade topics is
inconsistent with U.S. constitutional principles. Finally, he disagreed
with the provisions that assign specific authority to executive officials.
While echoing President Regan's viewpoints, I am not prepared to
comment on the constitutionality of the Act. However, I wish to point
out that the transferal of authority to decide unfair trade cases from
the President to the USTR will no doubt insulate U.S. trade policy
from taking into consideration the political and social background of
the issues involved, and might damage good relations established in
other fields with its trade partners.
My own experience of holding consultations with the U.S. indi-
cates that some issues, such as trade in certain items with a small trade
volume, ought not to become a concern for the U.S. However, issues
of such kind have been raised often, and in some cases, have pushed
the two sides into a corner, with resulting harm to the relationship of
the two countries. It could have been even worse when section 301
was wielded as a weapon to seek compromise from our side. It often
provoked emotional reaction from our people and made the problem
even more complicated. Furthermore, the Act makes it easier for a
U.S. industry to file an unfair trade case, and thus increases the
number of U.S. industries willing to put more pressure on, and unrea-
sonable requests toward, the U.S. government.
THE ROC's TRADE POLICY
The ROC is not a member of GATT. However, a trade agreement
was signed in 1978 between the ROC and the U.S. in which the ROC
committed itself to trade with the U.S. within the framework of
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GATT. As a result of that agreement, trade relations between the
ROC and the U.S. have grown rapidly. In 1979, according to our
customs statistics, ROC's exports to the U.S. stood at U.S. $5.7 bil-
lion, while imports from the U.S. stood at U.S. $3.4 billion. In 1988,
our exports to and imports from the U.S. increased to U.S. $23.4 bil-
lion and U.S. $13 billion respectively, resulting in a trade surplus of
U.S. $10.4 billion in our favor. The ROC was the fourth largest sup-
plier to the U.S. and the sixth largest market for U.S. products. In
terms of trade surplus, we ranked second among the U.S. trade part-
ners, next only to Japan. Our foreign exchange reserve had grown to
U.S. $75 billion at the end of August. The huge surplus and reserve
certainly have not only resulted in potential trade friction between our
two countries, but also have created an inflationary pressure on our
economy. In coping with the enactment of the U.S. Trade Act, the
ROC has taken a number of important measures to reduce our trade
surplus with the U.S.
1. The Liberalization of the ROC's Foreign Exchange Rate System
On the liberalization of its foreign exchange rate system, the ROC
has accelerated its pace to adjust its foreign exchange policy, even
though the exchange rate of NT dollar against U.S. dollar significantly
appreciated in 1986 and 1987. Since April 1989, we have relaxed
many practices that control the flow of foreign exchange. The limit on
annual foreign exchange inflow was raised to $500,000 per entity in
June of 1989, and again to $1,000,000 in November. The exchange
rate is determined freely in both the interbank trading and the retail
trading over U.S. $10,000 by a bid-asked quotation system. The for-
mer limits on daily fluctuations of the interbank rate are consequently
rescinded. Now'our foreign exchange trading system is similar to that
of other major foreign exchange markets. All of the above measures
provide a means for our foreign exchange system to redress our trade
imbalance with the U.S.
2. Market Liberalization: The Action Plan of the ROC
On the liberalization of our market, the basic policy of my country
is to transform our economic structure to increase domestic demand
for imports and thereby generate the growth of our GNP and a reduc-
tion of our trade surplus. Toward this end, a plan entitled "The Ac-
tion plan for Strengthening the Economic and Trade Ties with the
United States" was promulgated by my country in January 1989. This
plan outlines the basic policy that we are going to implement in the
next four years to reach the following objectives:
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1) Increase domestic demand's share of the GNP level to 93.7% and
reduce total trade surplus to 4% of our GNP by 1992.
2) Reduce the volume of our exports to the U.S. to one-third of the
volume of total exports.
3) Set up an implementation schedule to be followed by government
ministries and agencies concerned, thereby ensuring that the public
and the private sectors will pursue such policy and make necessary
adjustments in an orderly manner.
Under the objectives of the Plan set forth above, the ROC has taken
the following actions since January 1989:
1) Tariff reduction. In the Action Plan, we aim to reduce the av-
erage nominal duty rate from the present level of 12.57% to 7% by
1992. In terms of average effective duty rate, it will be reduced from
the present 5.66% to 3.5%, which will be comparable to those pre-
vailing currently in the industrialized countries. In August this year,
we reduced import tariffs on a total of 4,738 items by an average of
23%, which will bring the present average effective duty rate down to
a level even lower than the targeted 4.7% as set forth for this year in
the Action Plan.
2) The relaxation of import control and the simplification of import
procedure. In the Action Plan, we committed ourselves to review and
to liberalize restriction on certain imports that were previously subject
to import restrictions. We also planned to establish a "Negative List"
under which only specified items are required to obtain import licenses
for importation to the ROC. Items so specified in the list will be re-
viewed from time to time and be reduced to a minimum in line with
the GATT rules by which import restrictions apply only for the rea-
sons of national security, human health, pollution and defense. Based
on these commitments, we have so far lifted import restrictions on a
total of 556 items since January 1989. A total of 240 items of agricul-
tural products have also been included.
3) The opening of the ROC's service industry. Recognizing the ser-
vice industry's importance in future international trade, my govern-
ment has also implemented a series of liberalization programs to open
our service market to foreign competition. The programs cover all the
areas including transportation, banking, insurance and securities.
With respect to transportation, we will gradually open our aviation
and inland markets to the extent that foreign companies are allowed to
operate air cargo terminals outside of the airports and that foreigners
will be permitted to engage in the business of trucking. In banking, we
have recently amended our Bank Act and will consider permitting for-
eign bank branches to accept savings deposits under that Act.
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3. Increased Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
The so-called Special 301, which provides legal protection for in-
tellectual property rights (IPR), is another provision that influences
developing countries the most. In May 1989, the ROC was designated
as having failed to provide adequate protection for intellectual prop-
erty rights, and was included in the priority watch list which required
countries listed to make improvements within five months. Realizing
the importance of this issue, my country has made it clear in the Ac-
tion Plan that the strengthening of intellectual rights protection is also
a national goal. Toward achieving this goal, we have amended our
laws in regard to the protection of copyright, trademark and patent
rights. Efforts have also been made to educate the public on the im-
portance of IPR protection. Talks on how to enhance our actions ef-
fectively to prevent IPR infringement had also been concluded with
the U.S. during the period when the USTR reviewed the May watch
list. On November 1, 1989, the USTR announced the result of its
review and removed the ROC from the priority watch list to the ordi-
nary watch list, a sign reflecting the ROC's performance on the protec-
tion of intellectual property rights.
4. The Diversification of Our Markets
As mentioned above, we are the U.S.'s fourth largest supplier, and
we are the sixth largest buyer of U.S. goods. Our two-way trade with
the U.S. represented 30% of our GNP in 1988. To reduce our depen-
dence on the U.S. market, we are making great efforts to diversify our
market from the U.S. to other countries.
5. Actions Focusing Particularly on ROC-US Trade
We believe the measures that we have taken help to ameliorate the
trade imbalance between the ROC and the U.S. According to our cus-
toms statistics, in October 1989, our trade surplus with the U.S.
amounted to U.S. $10.2 billion. Compared to the surplus for the same
period of the previous year (excluding gold), this reflects a reduction of
10%. However, we have also noticed that our trade deficit with Japan
has increased by 13%, reaching U.S. $5.7 billion. It seems that Japan
is a free rider of our liberalization program. This leads us to believe
that the appreciation of the New Taiwan dollar and the opening of our
market do not provide a complete solution to our trade surplus prob-
lem with the U.S. We have therefore taken some other steps focusing
particularly on ROC-U.S. trade. One of the steps is a proposal to es-
tablish a Free Trade Area agreement between the U.S. and the ROC.
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Such an agreement, aimed at the removal of all trade barriers between
our two countries, would provide the U.S. with a far better chance
than other countries in our market. Other steps that we took to pro-
vide the U.S. with a better chance of selling products in our market are
as follows:
a) Assistance in Promoting U.S. Products. To assist the U.S. in
promoting sales in our market, my government has included in our
Action Plan certain measures especially designed for U.S. business-
men. These measures include the Fix Relending Facility under which
our EXIM Bank provides American exporters with loans to help them
market their products in Taiwan. We have also sent special procure-
ment missions to the U.S. to identify possible supply sources. So far
fifteen such missions have been sent to the U.S. since 1978, leading to
purchases of over U.S. $11 billion. We also sponsored trade shows
and encouraged the participation of U.S. companies to introduce their
products in the ROC's market. U.S. Products Shows, which serve this
purpose, were held twice since December, 1988, and have generated an
amount of U.S. $14.8 million in business opportunities for U.S.
businessmen.
b) Limit the Source of Supply to the US. Only. There are some
other measures that are regarded by our other trading partners as dis-
criminatory and not in conformity with GATT principles. At present,
only the U.S. and European countries are permitted to export their
cars to Taiwan. Moreover, some procurement projects by government
agencies or public enterprises are limited to U.S. and European coun-
tries and, in some cases, even limited to U.S. suppliers only. All this
explains one thing: we are doing everything possible to increase our
imports from the U.S.
THE PROSPECT OF ROC-U.S. TRADE RELATIONS
1. The Preclusion of the ROC from the Super 301 List
The U.S. has long been our most important trading partner, and
the rapid growth of our trade with the U.S. has been a major factor in
our fast economic growth. Despite our efforts to diversify our market
to include other areas such as Europe and Japan, we expect the U.S. to
continue to remain our most important trade partner. With the guide-
lines set forth in the Action Plan, I believe that our limited restrictions
on imports of industrial products will be eliminated almost entirely in
the very near future. The preclusion of the ROC from the Super 301
investigation announced in May this year demonstrated that the U.S.
has positively recognized the ROC's achievement in this area. Trade
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issues will, therefore, in my opinion, be focused more on agricultural
and service sectors in the coming years.
2. Future Focus of the U.S. 'Is nterest in the Taiwan Market
With respect to agriculture, except for a few items that are by na-
ture very sensitive and by which a large number of our farmers earn
their living, most of our products are open to foreign competition,
with the U.S. being our strongest competitor. Import tariffs on these
products are also low. Because 15.3 percent of our population is en-
gaged in agriculture on a limited amount of arable land, we still face
certain difficulties in making expeditious steps toward liberalizing our
agricultural market. We will, however, strive to abide by the GATT
restrictions against actions that distort trade, and maintain an agricul-
tural policy by which subsidies to our farmers will be based more on
income support than on price support.
With respect to the service sector, I believe more trade in service
products of which the U.S. is competitive will make the U.S. more
interested in securing a good share of the Taiwan market. More
American firms are expected to operate their business in the service
industry in Taiwan. Our demand for service products will also in-
crease because of the continual increase of our per capita income.
Take tourism for example: in 1987 a total of 448,000 tourists from
Taiwan visited the U.S. This number increased to 686,000 in 1988.
The active involvement of American business in this area will certainly
help reduce the imbalance of trade between our two countries.
THE ROC'S INTENTION TO BE A GATT MEMBER AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROC's TRADE POLICY
1. The ROC Benefits from the GATT Spirit
The ROC started to proceed with its industrialization program
very late in the 1960's. As an island economy with very scarce natural
resources, the ROC depends heavily on its foreign trade to sustain its
economy. The last three decades saw the ROC grow from an almost
under subsistence-level economy to one that is now approaching the
threshold of a developed country. The reasons behind the ROC's suc-
cess are many, but the one dominating reason is that the ROC has
always cherished the concept of free trade that has been promoted by
the GATT. Valuable assistance rendered to the ROC by the devel-
oped countries within the GATT framework has also played an im-
portant role in helping the ROC expand its foreign trade. For
example, the ROC profoundly appreciates the GSP treatment ac-
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corded by countries such as the U.S., Japan, Australia, Austria and
New Zealand for decades. Our exports to these countries have there-
fore been very competitive and successful.
2. The ROC is Willing to Assume More International Responsibility
With a view to sharing our success with the rest of the world, we
think now is the time for us to pay for our success by assuming more
international responsibility. Besides our willingness to render techni-
cal assistance and loans through such means as the International Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development Fund, which was established
last year to provide a total of U.S. $1.1 billion low-interest loans to
developing countries for use in their development projects, we have
decided to apply, when the time is appropriate,' for GATT member-
ship to assume more international responsibility. We have to accede
to the GATT as a developed country even though our per capita in-
come had just exceeded U.S. $6000 in 1988 - a level far behind the
standard definition of a developed country. No doubt our trade policy
will be greatly affected by the GATT principles once our application is
accepted. We will then review our trade policy from time to time to
follow the language and spirit of the GATT. This will assure our trad-
ing partners of the stability and transparency of our future trade pol-
icy. We sincerely believe our membership in GATT will be a
contributing factor to the continuous prosperity of the world
economy.
1. The ROC has formally submitted her application for GATT Membership on Jan. 1, 1990.
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